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THE ALLEGED OFFER, WHICH WAS NEITHER MADE NOR 8 
ACCEPTED, WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE ON THE UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT CLAIM UNDER RULE 408 OF THE IDAHO 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
III 
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT 12 
WAS NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICHED WAS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
IV 
ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARY TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION, THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WOULD NOT BE 
i 
16 
UNCONSCIONABLE FOR DEFENDANT TO RETAIN THE 
ENRICHMENT, IF ANY, SHE RECEIVED WAS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Conclusion 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff sued Defendant for $50,000.00 of the proceeds 
she received upon sale property claiming a horse barn 
and corrals he had installed on her premises increased the 
value. Defendant denied iff's claim. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The case was tried be the Honorable Jonathan Brody, 
District Judge. The Court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in favor Defendant and dismissed 
Plaintiff's case. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff's recital of s omitted significant 
evidence which supported 
Most significant was 
real estate broker with 17 
Court's decision. 
testimony of Lloyd Smith, a 
of experience in selling 
real property in Mini Cass area (Tr p. 290, L. 10). 
Smith had done a market analysis before he listed the 
property for sale. oyd testified that the horse barn and 
corrals added no value to Nancy's rural residence and 
-1-
igated acreage (Tr p. 300, L. 13). Lloyd Smith was the 
only witness with real estate expertise who testified on the 
ific issue of whether the horse barn and corrals added 
value to the Defendant's property. 
Plaintiff called J. Patrick Merrigan, a certified real 
estate appraiser (Tr p. 175, L. 20). The ntiff tried to 
adduce testimony from Pat Merrigan about 
construction of the building using regi 
cost of 
data regarding 
the cost of construction. Merrigan had not examined the 
barn and corrals (Tr p. 175, L. 9-16). He was not asked 
whether the horse barn and corrals contribut to the value 
of Defendant's property. 
The Defendant did not ask the Plaintiff to build the 
horse barn on her property, and she did not acquiesce in the 
construction of the horse barn until the ntiff wore down 
her resistence by his repeated insistence (Tr p. 240, L. 20-
24). There is no evidence in the record that the Defendant 
ever wavered from her insistence that the property was 
acqui by her as her separate property, and that she 
intended to retain it as her separate property (Tr p. 243, 
L. 3-23). 
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The Plaintiff was as £-employed farrier (Tr p. 330, 
L. 1-25). Due to f problems he could not marry (Tr 
p. 23, L. 18-20) He had no financial records to support his 
claimed investment (Tr p. 145, L. 13 25). He did not file 
income tax returns (Tr p. 146, L. 1-7). He had a passion 
for chariot racing as a hobby (Tr p. 124, L. 4-7), and he 
dreamed of owning his own horse barn to support his 
activity. 
When the De finally caved into Plaintiff's 
requests that he be lowed to build a horse barn on her 
property (Tr p. 243, L. 3 23), he started assembling it from 
two used labor he had acquired in the 1980s (Tr p. 
132, L. 17 20), some used roofing material from the Cassia 
Hospital he purchased $300.00 (Tr p. 134, L. 15-24), 
used corrugated metal he bought for $500.00 (Tr p. 134, L. 
1.14), and abandoned irrigation pipe he cut up for 
corral posts (Tr p. 136, L. 8.13). The labor shacks were 
just set on concrete blocks (Tr p. 135, L. 14-17). The 
quality of workmanship and materials was substandard (Tr p. 
245, L. 1-24). 
The horse barn was completed in 2002 (Tr p. 138, L. 13 
-3-
19). In 2006 the Defendant had grown tired of supporting 
the Plaintiff's racing habit. asked him to pay the 
irrigation bill for the pasture. The Plaintiff threw an 
empty money clip at her, and told him to get out of her 
home (Tr p. 254, L. 7-14). 
Nancy let him use the horse barn and corrals until 2008 
without payment of rent or utilit s (Tr p. 255, L. 7-24). 
Defendant told Plaintiff he could the horse barn (Tr p. 
257, L. 6-12), but he led to do so. 
Plaintiff provided help to Defendant in cleaning up 
the property when she originally purchased it, but he left 
it in a state of disrepair and a trashy condition. He 
hauled in an outhouse (Tr p. 287, L. 17-24, Ex. V), and left 
scrap material and boxes of used shoes lying around. 
Defendant had to haul loads of junk to the dump to make the 
property presentable, so it could d (Tr p. 258, L. 2-
16). The corral posts, which consisted of lengths of 
abandoned irrigation pipe, had open ends with no footings 
under them. Over time, they began to sink into the ground, 
so they would not support the rails and gates (Tr p. 
334, L. 25 and Tr p. 335, L. 1 4). 
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The Plaintiff lived in Defendant's home rent free from 
2000 to 2006, and he used Defendant's land and pasture rent 
free from 2002 until 2008 (Tr p. 142, L. 13-23). 
Nancy was employed on a full-time basis from the time 
the relationship began (Tr p. 240, L. 1-10, Ex. FF). 
The Trial Court found that the testimony of the 
Defendant was more credible than the testimony of the 
Plaintiff in the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order. Finding 42. (R p. 21). 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
IS DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
UNDER SECTION 12-121 OF THE IDAHO CODE AND RULE 54(e) (1) OF 
THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
NANCY ORTHMAN SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
UNDER SECTION 12-121 OF THE IDAHO CODE AND RULE 54(e) (1) OF 
THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF'S 
APPEAL IS PURSUED FRIVOLOUSLY, UNREASONABLY AND WITHOUT 
FOUNDATION. 
The award of attorney fees on appeal is proper under 
Section 12-121 of the Idaho Code and Rule 54(e) (1) of the 
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure when the appeal has been 
brought frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation 
Durrant v. Christensen, 17 Idaho 70, 785 P 2~ct 634 (1990); 
Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 591 P 
1078 (1979). 
This appeal has been pursued frivolously. The District 
Court's refusal to allow the alleged of of settlement to 
have been entered into the record is upheld by well-settled 
law as shown below. The argument that Rule 408 should not 
apply to the alleged offer was disingenuous. 
The District Court's conclusion that Orthman was not 
ustly enriched was supported by substant , competent 
The District Court's finding if there had 
a benefit to Nancy Orthman, it would not be 
unconscionable for her to retain the fit was likewise 
supported by substantial, competent evidence. 
In Excel Leasing Co. v. Christensen, 115 Idaho 708, 769 
p 585 (Ct. App. 1989) the Idaho Court Appeals held 
that where the Appellant failed on appeal to present any 
s ficant issue regarding a question of law, where no 
findings of fact made by the District Court were clearly or 
-6-
arguably unsupported by substantial evidence, or where the 
Court was not asked to establish any new legal standards or 
modify any existing ones and where the focus of the case was 
the application of subtle law to the facts, the appeal was 
deemed to be unreasonable and without foundation. 




STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When an action has been tried to a court sitting 
without a jury, appellate review is limited to ascertaining 
whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings of 
fact and whether these findings support the court's 
conclusions of law. Morris v. Frandsen, 101 Idaho 778, 780, 
6 2 1 , P 2nd 3 9 4 , 3 9 6 ( 19 8 0 ) . 
The findings of fact of the trial court will be 
accepted if they are supported by substantial, competent 
evidence, though that evidence may be controverted. Sun 
Valley Shamrock Res. 1 Inc. 1 v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 
Idaho 116, 118, 794 P 2nd 1389, 1391 (1990); Rueth v. State, 
-7-
103 Idaho 74, 77, 644 P 2nd 1333, 1336 (1982). 
The task of weighing evidence is within the province of 
the trial court. The appellate court therefore accords 
great deference to the trial judge's opportunity to weigh 
conflicting testimony and to assess the credibility of 
witnesses. Rueth, 103 Idaho at 77, 644 P 2nd at 1336; PFC, 
Inc. V. Rockland Tel. Co .• Inc., 121 Idaho 1036, 1038, 829 P 
2nd 1385, 1387 (Ct. App 1992). It follows that the 
appellate court will view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party. PFC, Inc., 121 Idaho at 
1038, 829 P 2nd at 1387; Martsch v. Nelson, 109 Idaho 95, 
100, 705 P 2nd 1050, 1055 (Ct. App. 1985). 
The findings of the trial court on the question of 
damages will not be set aside when based upon substantial 
and competent evidence. Trilogy Networks Sys., Inc. v. 
Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P 3rd 1119, 1121 (2007) 
II 
THE ALLEGED OFFER, WHICH WAS NEITHER MADE NOR ACCEPTED, WAS 
NOT ADMISSIBLE ON THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM UNDER RULE 408 
OF THE IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
The Plaintiff sued the Defendant claiming Defendant was 
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unjustly enriched by the horse barn and she built on 
her property. In his Complaint (R. P. 1 3) he claimed that 
she would be unjustly enriched by the sum $50,000.00 if 
she were allowed to retain the improvements without 
compensating him. 
In his opening statement Plaintiff's counsel reiterated 
that the case is a case seeking recovery unjust 
enrichment. (Tr p. 7, L. 5-6). He stressed that the case 
should be restricted to issues of unjust enrichment (Tr p. 
9, L. 22 25). Plaintiff's counsel then c imed that 
Defendant had agreed to reimburse Plaintiff $35,000.00 for 
his interest in the property (Tr 7 p. 24 and 25 and p. 8, L. 
1). Defendant's counsel placed Plaintiff's counsel and the 
Court on notice that the Defendant denied that such an offer 
was made and that evidence of such an offer would be 
inadmissible under Rule 408 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
( Tr p . 1 0 , L . 2 - 15 ) . 
On 
the Pla 
examination Plaintiff's counsel inquired of 
iff " ... after you separated did there come a time 
when you and she talked about how she was go to settle 
with you on the improvements?" (Tr p. 118, L. 15-17). 
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Defendant objected on the ground the testimony was 
inadmissible under Rule 408 (Tr p. 119, L. 7-11). 
Plaintiff's counsel then tried to recast the alleged 
offer as an agreement to settle (Tr p. 119, L. 12-15). The 
Court observed that an oral contract had not been plead (Tr 
p . 12 0 , L . 3 - 6 and 1 0 - 16 ) . Plaintiff's counsel then argued 
that there was a distinction between an offer to compromise 
and evidence of an agreement (Tr. p. 120, L. 17-25), and 
that an agreement should be treated as an admission, even 
though he was not suing for breach of an agreement. 
In the proposed offer of proof, Plaintiff did not say 
the offer was accepted by the Plaintiff. If the Plaintiff 
had accepted the offer, his complaint would have sought 
enforcement of the agreement rather than a claim for unjust 
enrichment. 
The Plaintiff well knew that testimony of the alleged 
settlement offer was not to be admitted, but he couldn't 
restrain himself from blurting it out (Tr p. 209, L. 9) 
The testimony was properly stricken (Tr p. 210, L. 1-2) 
Rule 408 is clearly designed to give the parties 
freedom to discuss settlement without having their efforts 
-10-
treated as admissions of liability or admissions as to the 
amount of damage for which they are responsible. 
Plaintiff has cited Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, 
111 Idaho 594, 726 P2nd 706 (1986) proposition that 
an offer of settlement or settlement agreement may be 
offered in evidence to show bias of a witness. Soria was a 
case involving multiple defendants. 
excluded evidence of a settlement 
trial court 
between plaintiffs 
and one of the defendants. The decision was upheld on 
appeal. 
Soria is distinguishable from the case at bar. Here 
the Plaintiff was not trying to prove bias of a non-party 
witness. The bias of a party can be assumed in a one-on-one 
situation. There is no reason to prove b 
was clearly trying to use the alleged 
The Plaintiff 
r as an admission 
liability and an admission on the amount of unjust 
enrichment. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 
759, 727 P2nd 1187 (1986) reviewed the strong policy 
favoring settlement and barring evidence relating to 
compromises or offers of compromise. That case involved 
-11-
complex issues of multiple defendants not present fore 
this Court. 
evidence. 
trial court excluded the settlement 
Idaho Supreme Court held that the trial 
judges have broad discretion in determining the 
admissibility such evidence, and their decision will not 
be overturned ent a clear showing of abuse, citing 
v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, supra. 
The t 
offer. 
court properly refused to admit the all 
III 
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT 




the Plaintiff to have prevailed in the 
Plaintiff was required to prove (1) 
the Defendant was unjustly enriched by the construction 
the barn and corrals on the Defendant's property and (2) 
that it would be unconscionable for the Defendant to retain 
the benefits without compensating the Plaintiff. Hixon v. 
Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P 2nd 1042 (1955); Continental 
Forest Products, Inc., v. Chandler Supply Company, 95 Idaho 
739, 518 P 1201 (1974); Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 
-12-
et. al., 101 Idaho 663, 619 P 2nd 1116 (1980). 
The measure of damages is not necessarily the value of 
the money, labor and materials provided by the Plaintiff to 
the Defendant, but the benefit the Defendant received which 
would be unjust for the Defendant to retain. Unjust 
enrichment is an equitable doctrine and is inapplicable when 
the Plaintiff in an action fails to provide the proof 
necessary to establish the value of the benefit conferred 
upon the Defendant. Nielson v. Davis, 98 Idaho 314, 528 P 
2nd 19 6 ( 19 7 4) . 
The value of any benefit unjustly received by the 
Defendant in an action based upon unjust enrichment must be 
proven to a reasonable certainty. Olsen v. Quality Pak, 
Co., 93 Idaho 607, 469 P 2nd 45 (Cited with approval in 
Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, et. al supra). 
The District Court found against the Plaintiff on both 
elements of Plaintiff's claim, i.e. the Court found the 
Defendant was not unjustly enriched, and the Court found 
that it would not be unconscionable for the Defendant to 
retain the benefit, if any, which was conferred. 
Plaintiff's copious recital of evidence supporting the 
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Plaintiff's position is set forth in the Plaintiff's 
Statement of Facts. For 
evidence was evidence 
most part, the Plaintiff's 
time, labor and material expended 
in constructing t horse barn and corrals on Defendant's 
property. The Plaintiff led to produce a single credible 
witness who could establish that the value of the 
Defendant's property at the time the property was sold was 
greater with the horse barn and corrals than it would have 
been had they not been constructed on the Defendant's 
property. 
The Plaintiff produced a certified appraiser, J. 
Patrick Merrigan, who had not inspected the barn and was not 
asked whether th barn and corrals increased the value of 
Defendant's property. 
Plaintiff provided witnesses who said the barn was well 
laid out to be a barn for horses, but they provided no 
evidence that the barn and corrals increased the value of 
Defendant's property. 
Plaintiff testimony of the buyers, Tony Periria 
and Megan Sorenson Pe a which showed they placed a high 
value on the barn when compared to the home, but cross 
-14-
examination revealed that they had no expertise on the issue 
of whether the Defendant's property was worth more money 
with the horse barn and corrals than without them. 
The Defendant called Lloyd Smith, a real estate agent 
and broker with 17 years of experience who had inspected the 
premise and had given the Defendant a broker's opinion of 
value prior to the time the property was listed for sale. 
His opinion of value was $130,940.00. (Ex. D). 
He testified that real estate agents routinely describe 
rural homes with irrigated acreage as horse property, 
whether the properties have barns and corrals or not (Tr p. 
298, L. 8-14). The most important part of Lloyd Smith's 
testimony was that Nancy Orthman's home and five acres would 
have sold for just as much money without the horse barn and 
corrals as it sold with them (Tr p. 296, L. 13 & 14; Tr p. 
300, L. 13). He provided comparisons of homes with acreages 
without horse barns and corrals to support his opinion that 
the market for Nancy's property would have generated the 
sale price of $130,000.00 without the barn and corrals. 
If Nancy could have received as much money for her 
property without the barn and corrals as she received for it 
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with the barn and corrals, she was not unjustly enriched. 
Although the property was sold to a couple who loved the 
horse barn, Plaintiff failed to show that the property sold 
more quickly because of the presence of the horse barn and 
corrals or that she received more money because of their 
presence. 
Nancy Orthman considered the horse barn and corrals 
which were built with used material and poorly maintained by 
Chuck Kendall to be an eyesore (Tr p. 332, L. 3-7). To some 
people the barn and corals may have been treasure. To 
others they may have been trash. The bottom line is that 
Nancy was no better off with them than without, so she was 
not enriched. 
Judge Brody's finding that Nancy Orthman was not 
enriched by the addition of the horse barn and corrals was 
supported by substantial, competent evidence. Findings of 
the trier of fact which are supported by substantial, 
competent evidence are not to be disturbed on appeal. 
IV 
ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARY TO THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION, THE 
CONCLUSION THAT IT WOULD NOT BE UNCONSCIONABLE FOR DEFENDANT 
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TO RETAIN THE ENRICHMENT, IF ANY, SHE RECEIVED WAS SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Once the trial court determined that no benefit was 
conferred on Nancy Orthman by the construction of the horse 
barn and corrals, it was not necessary for the court to 
enter a conclusion that if the Defendant did receive a 
benefit, it would not be unjust for her to retain it without 
compensating the Plaintiff. Nevertheless, that conclusion 
by the Court was supported by substantial, competent 
evidence and was not an abuse of discretion. 
The Defendant purchased the home and acreage for 
herself and her three children. She did not purchase it to 
provide a place for the Plaintiff to keep and train his race 
horses (Tr p. 330, L. 1-3). The Plaintiff pestered the 
Defendant about building a horse barn on the property, until 
she finally relented. She made it clear to him that he was 
not going to obtain an interest in her property by building 
a horse barn (Tr p. 330, L. 13-25; Tr p. 331, L. 1-16). 
With the exception of occasional intervals in which the 
parties separated due to disagreements, the Plaintiff 
resided with the Defendant from the time the property was 
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purchased in 2001 until an argument in April 2006 when 
the Plaintiff re to help with the annual irrigation 
bill for the property. The Plaintiff threw his money clip 
at the Defendant, and the Defendant told him to leave the 
home (Tr p. 254, L. 1-9). 
The Defendant still allowed the Plaintiff to keep and 
train his horses on the property for the balance of 2006, 
all of 2007 and until the middle of 2008 (Tr p. 255, L. 2-
25; Tr p. 266, L. 1-25 and p. 267, L. 1-15). During that 
time, the Plaintiff paid no rent for use of the home and 
utilities nor for use of the pasture and land on which the 
barn and corrals were located. All of those expenses were 
paid by the Defendant {Tr p. 142, L. 13-17; Tr p. 255, L. 
15-22). 
The Plaintiff did little or nothing to maint n the 
barn and premises. After he was banned from Defendant's 
home he brought in a dumpy looking outhouse (Tr p. 268, L. 
1-21) (Exhibit M). 
The Plaintiff was given the opportunity to remove the 
barn and corrals from premises before it was sold. The 
fence posts were not anchored in concrete. housing from 
-18-
the sugar factory labor camp were ~ust resting on cinder 
blocks. The Plaintiff cons moving the barn and 
corrals to a property owned by Ken and JoAnna Erickson, but 
he did not pursue that opportunity (Tr p. 345, L. 5-21). 
When he left the property, it was strewn with boxes of old 
horseshoes and scrapped and broken building materials (Tr p. 
258, L. 2-16). He took the gates (Tr p. 154, L. 20-23). 
The Plaintiff testified horse racing was not an 
activity pursued for business purposes. During the 
testimony, it was clear that built the barn and corrals 
so he could pursue his passion for racing. He did not 
build the barn and corrals with an expectation for 
compensation or profit (Tr p. 124, L. 2-6). He had 
financial problems when the relationship began (Tr p. 152, 
L. 13-23). There was nothing to indicate that he tried to 
improve his financial circumstances dur the time of the 
relationship. 
The trial court observed in Finding No. 42 that the 
Defendant was a more credible witness than the Plaintiff. 
The weight given to the testimony of witnesses is to be 
determined by the trier of 
-19-
While it may not have been necessary for the Court to 
have gone so far as to characterize the Plaintiff as an 
"officious intermeddler", the Court's conclusion of law that 
Defendant did not receive a benefit which would be 
unconscionable for her to retain was well supported by the 
evidence and was not an abuse of the Court's discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Nancy Orthman should be awarded her costs and attorney fees. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
Chisholm Law Office 
By: LQv1AA--lt{;// Llv~1;,'--t.....__ 
Donald J. Chi olm 
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